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INTRODUCTION 
In what ways can previously encountered and stored information affect present 
behavior? That is, how does memory affect behavior, particularly when one is not 
consciously attempting to remember the previously encountered mformation? The answers 
to this question about memory have been guided by the growth in research on a phenomenon 
called implicit memory (see Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988; Roediger & McDermott, 
1993; and Schacter, 1987, for extensive reviews). Implicit memory is demonstrated when 
previously studied information affects performance on a current task without the individual's 
consciously recollecting the information (Schacter, 1987). Implicit memory research also 
has led researchers to take seriously differences among different types of memory tests 
(Blaxton, 1989; Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989; Schacter, 1987). The differences among 
the kinds of memory tests appear have important theoretical implications for developing 
plausible frameworks for conceptualizing memory. 
Overview 
This dissertation tested a new framework for conceptualizing a specific kind of 
memory—perceptual implicit memory. It begins by discussing different kinds of memory 
and memory tests, with a focus on four major frameworks of perceptual implicit memory. 
Following this, some problems with the standard, accepted view of perceptual implicit 
memory are noted. A new, broader framework is introduced that views perceptual implicit 
memory as episodic decision memory. Four experiments designed to test the new firamework 
are reported. Finally, the implications of these four experiments for the proposed framework 
and for other frameworks of perceptual implicit memory are discussed. 
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Background 
Kinds of Memory Tests 
Memory tests have been categorized into four major classes based upon the type of 
instructions (explicit vs. implicit) given to participants taking the test and upon the type of 
processing (conceptual vs. perceptual) invoked by the test (Blaxton, 1989; Schacter, 1987). 
Explicit tests instruct participants to consciously recollect information that had been studied 
during a prior episode and to use that information on the present task. For example, on a 
standard recall memory test, participants are instructed to remember words studied 
previously and to write down as many of those words as they can. Memory is directly 
measured in terms of success at the task. Implicit tests do not instruct participants to 
consciously recollect information that has been studied during a prior episode. Rather, 
participants are just given a task to complete. In these tests, memory for previously studied 
information is inferred when the previously studied information affects performance on the 
present task (Schacter, 1987). For example, in a perceptual identification task (a form of 
implicit memory test), participants are shown words for a very brief time (33-50 ms, before a 
pattern mask) and the participants are asked to report the words they see. Memory is inferred 
in this task when participants report more words that had been previously studied (old words) 
than words that had not been previously studied (new words). 
Conceptual tests are memory tests that require the participant to engage in semantic 
or conceptual processing of words to successfully complete the task. The recall test 
described previously is an example of a conceptual test. Perceptual tests are memory tests 
that require the participant to engage in data-driven or perceptual processing of words to 
successfully complete the task. The perceptual identification task described previously is an 
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example of a perceptual test. The presence or absence of a generation effect on test 
performance has been used as a "litmus test" to classify a test as conceptual or perceptual in 
nature (e.g., Blaxton, 1989). To determine if there is a generation effect, words are studied in 
one of two conditions: the read and generate conditions. In the read condition, the word is 
presented alone (XXX - cold). In the generate condition, the word is generated by the 
participant (hot - ?) in response to a related cue (cf, Jacoby, 1983). Because the generate 
condition requires the participant to engage in semantic, conceptual processing, tests in 
which performance is better when words are generated at encoding are called conceptual 
tests. Because the read condition requires participants to do the greatest amount of 
percepmal processing of the word, tests in which performance is better when words are read 
alone at encoding are called perceptual tests (Blaxton, 1989; Jacoby, 1983). 
Using these two dimensions, four classes of tests have been identified. Conceptual 
explicit tests include the standard memory tests of recall and recognition'. These are direct 
tests in which the instructions to participants are to use their memory for a prior encoding 
episode and performance is better for items originally studied in the generate than in the read 
condition. Conceptual implicit tests include general knowledge tests in which participants 
are asked questions that can be answered with words that had been previously studied, but 
participants are not instructed to use previously studied words to answer the questions. 
Performance is better for items originally studied in the generate condition than in the read 
condition. Perceptual explicit tests include graphemic cued recall tests in which participants 
are asked to complete three-letter word stems with a word that they had previously studied. 
Thus, the instmctions are to use memory for previously studied words, but performance is 
better for items originally studied in the read than in the generate condition. Perceptual 
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implicit tests include a number of tests. The perceptual identification test described 
previously is one example. A second example is a word stem completion test in which 
participants are required to complete three-letter word stems with the first word that comes to 
mind. A third example is a lexical decision test in which participants are required to decide if 
a stimulus is a word or a nonword. In none of the perceptual implicit memory tests are 
participants instructed to use previously studied words, but having previously studied the 
words does improve performance on the tests. In addition, performance is better with words 
originally in the read dian the generate condition. The focus of the current research is on 
perceptual implicit memory test performance. 
Although perceptual implicit memory tests are like other types of memory tests in 
that they appear to rely on some minimal level of attentional, controlled processing at 
encoding (e.g., Crabb & Dark, 1999a, 1999b; Hawley & Johnston, 1991; MacDonald & 
MacLeod, 1998), they are also different. Supporting this are studies demonstrating that 
perceptual implicit memory for words requires the accessing of the lexical unit at encoding 
(Weldon, 1991) and is affected by manipulations of the perceptual characteristics of the word 
(e.g., its modality or font) between encoding and test (e.g., Graf & Ryan, 1990; Jacoby, Levy, 
& Steinbach, 1992; Roediger & Blaxton, 1987). Coupled with its sensitivity to 
lexical/perceptual manipulations is the insensitivity of perceptual implicit memory to 
semantic manipulations like the generation effect (e.g., Blaxton, 1989; Jacoby, 1983), which 
affect conceptual tests. Finally, manipulations of divided attention appear to separate 
perceptual implicit memory tests fit)m all other tests—dividing attention at encoding affects 
both explicit and implicit conceptual tests and also affects explicit perceptual tests, but does 
not affect perceptual implicit tests (e.g.. Mulligan, 1997; Mulligan & Hartman, 1996; Smith 
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& Oscar-Bennan, 1990). Thus, perceptual implicit memory tests appear to be quite different 
from other types of memory tests. 
Models of Perceptual Implicit Memory Test Performance 
The distinctive nature of perceptual implicit memory test performance compared to 
performance on other types of memory tests requires an explanation and several explanatory 
models appear in the literature. The conceptualizations of perceptual implicit memory test 
performance in the literature can be classified by whether they view the representations 
underlying perceptual implicit memory test performance as abstract or episodic in nature 
(Tenpenny, 1995). Episodic representations reflect information from specific events while 
abstract representations do not. As applied to words, a memory that encoded the occurrence 
of a particular word on a particular list in a particular context would be an episodic 
representation, while a memory that encoded the occurrence of the word without reference to 
its context would be an abstract representation. Abstract representations are entries in a 
mental lexicon. 
The question over the episodic versus abstract nature of representations is not just 
important in perceptual implicit memory research, but has become a central question in a 
number of areas of research within cognitive psychology. For example, researchers have 
posited episodic and abstract theories in negative priming (e.g., Neill, Valdes, & Terry, 1995, 
vs. Tipper & Cranston, 1985), categorization (e.g., Nosofsky & Pahneri, 1997, vs. Rosch & 
Mervis, 1975), and automatization (e.g., Logan, 1988, vs. Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). 
Indeed, the fact that this episodic/abstract debate is so widespread suggests that it is an 
important issue to be investigated as theories in a field are developed. 
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What follows is a discussion of four major models/firameworks of perceptual implicit 
memory test performance. The four models are categorized by how they conceptualize the 
underlying representations: two abstract views (Ratcliff & McKoon, 1997; Tulving & 
Schacter, 1990) and two episodic views (Masson & MacLeod, 1992; Roediger, Weldon, & 
Challis, 1989). 
Abstract Models 
There are two major models of perceptual implicit memory that posit that the 
representations underlying perceptual implicit memory are abstract in nature. The models 
differ in the nature of the abstract representations they posit. They also differ in whether or 
not the representations are part of a single memory system (the counter model) or are part of 
a memory system that is distinct from other memory systems (the multiple memory system 
view). 
The Multiple Memory System View. Tulving and Schacter (1990) proposed a 
multiple memory system view that posits the existence of at least four major memory 
systems: an episodic memory system, a semantic memory system, a procedural memory 
system, and a perceptual representation memory system (PRS). According to this view, 
different memory tests tap into the different memory systems. Episodic memory tests (e.g., 
recall and recognition) tap directly into the episodic memory system, semantic tests (e.g., 
general knowledge questions) t^ directly into the semantic system, motor-skill tasks (e.g., 
riding a bicycle) tap directly into the procedural system, and perceptual implicit memory tests 
(e.g., perceptual identification) tap directly into the PRS. Supporting this view are 
neurological studies demonstrating that damage to one of these systems does not affect the 
performance of the other systems (e.g., Gabrieli, Fleischman, Keane, Reminger, & Morrell, 
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1995). The representations within the PRS are distinct from those in the episodic and 
semantic systems in that they lack . .stored focal traces..." (Tulving & Schacter, 1990, p. 
302). Rather, these representations appear to consist of abstract, global structural 
descriptions of the stimuli (words or objects) that are not tied to specific prior episodes 
(Schacter, Cooper, & Delaney, 1990; Tulving & Schacter, 1990). 
The Counter Model Ratcliff and McKoon (1997) proposed a counter model of 
performance on perceptual identification, a specific perceptual implicit memory test. 
According to the model, abstract representations of words act as counters that attract counts 
when words are presented. Prior exposure to a word at encoding allows a representation to 
function as an even stronger attractor when the word is again presented at test. Thus, prior 
exposure allows a representation to attract and collect more counts than it normally would 
(and more than other representations) when a word is subsequently shown. Counts are 
collected until one representation reaches a criterion (measured relative to other 
representations), resuhing in a decision about the word. The decision is a perceptual decision 
or identification of the word. Although the counters are affected by prior exposure, they are 
not themselves episodic representations. They are similar to Morton's (1969,1979) 
logogens. Prior exposure turns them into attractors and it is their status as attractors that 
leads to perceptual implicit memory. 
Episodic Models 
Two major episodic models of perceptual implicit memory will be discussed. Both 
models posit that ail memory tests reflect the operation of a single memory system. Both 
views emphasize the importance of cognitive processes. The models differ in the kind of 
processes that are important for perceptual implicit memory. 
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The Transfer Appropriate Processing Framework. Roediger and colleagues 
(Roediger, 1990; Roediger & Blaxton, 1987; Roediger et al., 1989) proposed a Transfer-
Appropriate Processing (TAP) framework that posits that perceptual implicit memory 
performance is episodic in nature. According to TAP, performance on any memory test is a 
function of the degree to which the cognitive processing engaged in at test recapitulates the 
cognitive processing engaged in at encoding. Within this framework, two major classes of 
processing were proposed: perceptual and conceptual. Perceptual (or data-driven) processing 
focuses on the surface-form and lexical representations of words while conceptual processing 
focuses on the meaning of a word and how its memory representation relates to other 
memory representations. Regardless of whether a test is implicit or explicit in nature, 
perceptual test performance (e.g., perceptual identification, graphemic cued recall) is a 
function of the perceptual processing of words during a prior episode and conceptual test 
performance (e.g., general knowledge, recall) is a function of the conceptual processing of 
words during a prior episode (Blaxton, 1989). 
The Interpretation Framework. Masson and MacLeod (1992) proposed an 
interpretation framework for viewing perceptual implicit memory test performance that also 
posits that perceptual implicit memory is episodic in nature. According to Masson and 
MacLeod, encoding can be roughly split into two phases: interpretive processing and 
elaborative processing. Interpretive processes are context-sensitive processes that enable one 
to gain an initial interpretation of a stimulus. Interpretive processes are not restricted to 
orthographic or lexical processes and often will include semantic information if such 
information is necessary for a proper interpretation of the stimulus. Elaborative processing 
then takes the established interpretation and relates it to previously stored memory 
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representations. It is important to note that this distinction is orthogonal to the 
perceptual/conceptual distinction of the TAP framework (Roediger et al., 1989). According 
to Masson and MacLeod, both interpretive and elaborative processing may use either, or 
both, perceptual and conceptual characteristics of a stimulus. Thus, semantic processing of 
the word at encoding will increase later perceptual implicit memory, but only if the semantic 
processing at encoding was a part of the initial interpretation of the word. The framework 
posits that interpretive processes underlie perceptual implicit memory test performance and 
elaborative processes underlie explicit memory test performance. 
Evaluation of and Problems with Current Models 
Although their accounts of memory are different, all four of the major views 
described posit that perceptual implicit memory for words is dependent upon changes in 
some perceptual, lexical system that underlies word identification. Tulving and Schacter 
(1990) view this as a memory system that is flmctionally (and anatomically) distinct from 
other memory systems. Ratcliff and McKoon (1997) view this system as consisting of a 
number of abstract lexical counters. The TAP framework (Roediger et al., 1989) emphasizes 
the class of processing that is required to make changes in this system (perceptual 
processing). Masson and MacLeod (1992) view the necessary processing to make changes in 
the system as interpretive, rather than just perceptual. Yet, while the particulars of the views 
are different, many of their conclusions and predictions are the same. Specifically, only 
manipulations that affect this perceptual, lexical system should have an effect on perceptual 
implicit memory. Thus, the view that perceptual implicit memory reflects changes within a 
perceptual, lexical system has become a standard view in implicit memory research. 
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Much of the research in perceptual implicit memory supports this standard view. The 
research showing no levels-of-processing effect on perceptual implicit memory coupled with 
effects of perceptual manipulations on perceptual implicit memory provides strong support 
for the standard view (see previous discussion). However, the literature is not perfectly clear. 
In fact, recent research suggests that there might be more to perceptual implicit memory than 
has been posited by the standard view. Mulligan (1999) reported that making two responses 
to a word at encoding leads to lower perceptual implicit memory than making one response 
to the word at encoding. Because making one versus two responses should not produce 
differences in the perceptual, lexical system, this finding cannot be handled by the standard 
view. Crabb and Dark (1999c) demonstrated that making an overt, vocal response to a word 
at encoding leads to increased perceptual implicit memory when the perceptual implicit 
memory test (perceptual identification) also requires an overt, vocal response. Taken 
together, these studies show that perceptual implicit memory appears to be affected by 
processing outside of the perceptual, lexical system; it appears to reflect at least response 
processing as well. 
An Episodic Decision Memory Approach 
If perceptual implicit memory reflects more than just changes within a perceptual, 
lexical system, the standard view of perceptual implicit memory test performance is not 
adequate. What is needed is a new way of conceptualizing perceptual implicit memory test 
performance. As a first step in developing a new view, consider what actually happens 
during a perceptual implicit memory task. During a perceptual implicit memory task, 
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participants are shown a stimulus (often in a degraded form) and asked to make some kind of 
a decision on the stimulus (e.g., "what is this word?" in perceptual identification, "what word 
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starts with these letters?" in word stem completion, or "is this a word?" in lexical decision). 
Usually, either the stimuli are quickly presented or a speeded decision is required. One is 
able to make the decision more accurately or more quickly if one has interacted with the 
stimulus in the past. The standard view focuses on the facilitation of the perceptual 
processing preceding the decision. The proposed view broadens the focus to include the 
actual decision. 
According to this new view, perceptual implicit memory is best viewed as episodic 
decision memory, reflecting the beneficial effect of prior decisions about the present stimulus 
when it was presented in similar circumstances. If this view is appropriate, it might provide 
new insights into the nature of perceptual implicit memory. However, before considering 
such a view, it would be useful to find evidence that prior decisions about a stimulus aid an 
individual's processing and decision making in a present task. 
In classical theories of decision making (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), 
individuals make a decision by surveying a set of solutions, assigning a weight to each of the 
solutions, and choosing the most appropriate solution. Although such theories are powerful 
in predicting much decision-making behavior, it is not apparent that this is the most 
appropriate class of model to use in explaining the type of decision making that occurs in a 
perceptual implicit memory test. Decisions in a perceptual implicit memory test usually 
occur very quickly (within a few hundred milliseconds), making it difficult to generate 
multiple solutions, weight each, and select the best solution. In addition, the instructions in 
many perceptual implicit memory tests explicitly tell participants to respond with the first, 
rather than the best, solution that comes to mind. Thus, classical decision theories do not 
seem to c^ture the ^e of decisions that are made during perceptual implicit memory tests. 
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There is a relatively new class of decision-making theories that might be capable of 
capturing the kind of decision making that occurs during a perceptual implicit memory test. 
Theories in this class attempt to capture the decision making processes that occur in 
naturalistic settings and they operate &om a very different set of assumptions than classical 
theories (Orasanu & Connolly, 1993). One naturalistic theory of decision making is Klein's 
Recognition-Primed Decision model of rapid decision making (Klein, 1993). The goal of 
Klein's theory is to describe how experts make decisions in time-pressured situations (e.g., 
the decision of a firefighter on how to fight a specific fire). According to Klein, when 
experts make a decision in a time-sensitive situation, they do not engage in the decision­
making processes posited by classical theories. Rather than generating multiple solutions 
and choosing the best among alternative solutions, experts appear to generate a single, 
plausible solution and to initiate actions based upon the solution. 
Central to Klein's model is the role of situation assessment. There are four 
components to this situation assessment: a) an understanding of the goals to be accomplished 
in the present situation, b) an increasing salience of the important, physical cues in the 
environment, c) formation of expectancies to check the accuracy of the assessment, and d) 
identification and selection of appropriate actions. In some manner, these four components 
work to generate one workable solution that is acted upon until completed or the situation 
changes, requiring the generation of another solution. In a sense, the idea is that an expert 
uses prior episodes to recognize the present situation as typical of a certain class of problems. 
Generated with this recognition is a single plausible solution to that class of problem. 
Klein's (1993) model has been supported by naturalistic studies of experts, often fire-
fighting commanders (Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986). When conunanders 
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enter the scene of a fire, they gather information on the nature of the fire (e.g., where it is 
located in the building, how long it has been burning, are there people in the building). As 
they gather the information, they generate actions to be carried out (e.g., where to position 
firefighters, what area of the building to cover, etc.). When asked to describe how they make 
decisions, commanders state that they do not generate multiple actions and choose the best 
one as is posited by classical theories of decision making. Rather, they report that they 
choose the first course of action that comes to mind and follow it until either the fire is out or 
the nature of the fire changes requiring a change in the course of action. The commanders' 
reports are in line with Klein's model. 
If one can accept the assimiption that situation assessment relies on memories of prior 
fires, one can see parallels between the situation assessment by expert firefighters and the 
cognitive processes underlying the tasks examined in perceptual implicit memory research. 
Just as with the participants in Klein's research, the participants in perceptual implicit 
memory tasks with words as stimuli are experts, in this case they are expert readers. In 
addition, the participants are required to make quick decisions in time-pressured situations. 
The proposed view is that the decisions made during these time-pressured perceptual implicit 
memory tests are affected by previous decisions made on the stimuli presented during the 
test. If the proposed view is supported, it would not only be relevant to models of perceptual 
implicit memory, but might also be of importance to researchers in naturalistic decision 
making. The lack of a description of the cognitive mechanisms underlying situation 
assessment in Klein's (1993) model has been identified as a major drawback to the theory 
(Doherty, 1993). If the proposed view is supported, it might indicate the nature of at least 
one of the mechanisms underlying situation assessment in Klein's model. 
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THE CURRENT RESEARCH 
Introduction 
The current research tested the hypothesis that perceptual implicit memory is affected 
not just by the prior perceptual processing, but also by the prior decisions resulting from the 
perceptual processing. A number of positions concerning the nature of perceptual implicit 
memory are implied by this hypothesis. First, perceptual implicit memory is a form of 
episodic memory. Specifically, perceptual implicit memory is a result of retrieving a prior 
decision episode. The level of displayed perceptual implicit memory is a direct function of 
the degree to which the prior decision context is instantiated in the subsequent test. In the 
extant literature, typically the decision made about the stimulus in a prior context (i.e., at 
encoding) is similar to the decision to be made in the subsequent context (i.e., at test). 
According to the proposed view, three aspects of the context potentially can affect the level 
of perceptual implicit memory—the physical context (what are the characteristics of the 
surroundings in which the stimulus occurs and a decision is made?), the decision processing 
context (what kind of decision is being made about the stimulus?), and the response context 
(what action is taken based upon the decision that is reached?). 
The proposed view is similar to the extant views in a number of ways. It is similar to 
the counter model (Ratcliff & McKoon, 1997) in that perceptual implicit memory reflects a 
decision process, but in the proposed view the nature of the decision is much broader. The 
decision process described in the counter model is simply a perceptual decision of what the 
stimulus is. In the proposed view the decision includes identification of the stimulus but also 
includes the kind of decision that is made and the response that is produced. The proposed 
view also has similarities with the TAP fiameworic (Roediger et al., 1989) and the 
15 
interpretation framework (Masson & MacLeod, 1992), but it extends these views. The 
proposed view focuses on the nature of the processing underlying memory tests, just as do 
the TAP and interpretation frameworks, but the nature of the processing underlying 
perceptual implicit memory is more broadly conceptualized. It is not just lexical, perceptual 
processing or just interpretative processing. In a sense, the proposed view is an extension of 
Tulving's encoding specificity hypothesis (Tulving & Thomson, 1973) in which the relevant 
context is the context of the decision process. 
The proposed view falls into a class of episodic memory models called instance 
theories^ (e.g., Hintzman, 1986; Logan, 1988,1990). In Logan's instance theory of 
automatization, performance on a task (e.g., reading) can be accomplished either by 
computing an algorithm (determining the letters, translating those to morphemes/phonemes, 
accessing the lexical representation, and making the correct response) or by retrieving a prior 
instance (or episode) that includes the perceptual features of the word and the response of 
reading the word. Upon presentation of a word, the algorithm and the retrieval processes 
"race" to determine which will guide the current reading response. In general, retrieval of an 
instance is faster than computation of an algorithm, so retrieval will usually win the race 
(provided that there are a sufficient number of instances of reading the word stored in 
memory). When there are multiple instances, each of the instances races with the others and 
the instance that is most similar to the present situation is the one that usually wins. Thus, in 
Logan's model of automaticity, similarity to a prior episode or instance is critical in 
deteimining how a current response is accomplished. Logan (1990) has suggested that 
perceptual implicit memory also reflects the operation of an instance-based memory system. 
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The proposed view adds to Logan's view by positing that the instance being retrieved 
includes the decision made in the prior episode. 
One general problem with instance theories is determining what constitutes an 
instance. Instances appear to reflect discrete episodes of time. Time, however, progresses 
continuously, with potential "episodes" flowing into one another, making it difficult to 
determine when one episode begins and where one ends. In the proposed view, the instance 
that is retrieved and that guides performance on a perceptual implicit memory task includes 
both the initial perceptual processing of the stimulus, the initial decision made upon the 
stimulus, and the response made to the stimulus. Thus, the retrieved instance contains 
information about processes that began with presentation of the stimulus and ended with the 
decision that was reached. Viewed in this way, the proposed view accepts as partially correct 
the standard view (namely that perceptual implicit memory reflects changes in a 
perceptual/lexical processing system), but also states that the memory representations 
underlying perceptual implicit memory are episodic in nature and include decision and 
response processes. 
Predictions 
Three predictions of the proposed view were tested. The first prediction is that higher 
levels of perceptual implicit memory should be found when the decision made concerning 
the word at test matches the decision made concerning the word at encoding. The second 
prediction is that higher levels of perceptual implicit memory should be found when the 
response made to the word at test matches the response made to word at encoding. The third 
prediction is that higher levels of perceptual implicit memory should be found when the 
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physical context surrounding the word at encoding is important to the decision processes and 
matches the test context. 
The predictions were tested in three experiments. Each of the experiments tested for 
the presence of a context-dependency effect in perceptual implicit memory. A context-
dependency effect is found when the level of memory is higher when the context (or 
circumstances) at encoding and test match (Smith, 1988) than when they mismatch. An 
example of what a context-dependency effect on perceptual implicit memory might look like 
is shown in Figure I. Perceptual implicit memory is usually measured by the improvement 
5 0.15 
f 0.05 
Context at 
Encoding 
• A 
• B 
B 
Context at test 
Figure 1. An example of a context dependency effect on perceptual 
implicit memory. 
in performance on old (previously presented) items over new (not previously presented) 
items. The improvement is indicated by the magnitude of the old-new difference score. 
Figure 1 shows context-dependency because a higher level of perceptual implicit memory 
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(i.e., a larger old-new difference) is found when some aspect of the context at test matches 
the same aspect of the context in which words were presented at encoding. 
The improvement in memory when the context at test and encoding match is thought 
to occur because the context from the encoding episode that is reinstated at test worics as a 
retrieval cue to help retrieve the prior episode from memory (Smith, 1988). Most context-
dependency studies have examined explicit memory, primarily recall. The proposed view 
predicts that reinstating the context of a prior decision episode during a perceptual implicit 
memory test will improve perfonnance on the test. 
Researchers have identified different kinds of context that might have an effect on 
memory (e.g., Baddeley, 1982; Geiselman & Bjork, 1980; Mori & Graf, 1996). Geiselman 
and Bjork (1980) contrasted intra- and extra-item contexts. Intra-item context refers to 
features intrinsic to the stimulus (e.g., color, modality, language, font). Extra-item context 
refers to aspects of the environment that are separate from the stimulus (e.g., location, 
background, the internal state of the individual). Baddeley (1982) distinguished between 
integrated contexts that affect the manner in which an individual encodes the stimulus and 
isolated contexts that do not affect the manner in which an individual encodes the stimulus 
and does not have a direct connection to the stimulus. Research has found both intra- and 
extra-item context-dependency effects on explicit memory (particularly recall), especially 
when integrated contexts are used (Smith, 1988). The proposed view predicts both intra- and 
extra-item context-dependency effects, but only when the context is an integral part of the 
decision process. 
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Overview of Experiments 
As stated earlier, three major aspects of the decision episode context were 
investigated. Others have found evidence for intra-item context-dependency effects on 
perceptual implicit memory. For example, higher levels of perceptual implicit memory are 
found when the modality (Kirsner, Milech, & Standen, 1983) and the font (e.g., Graf & 
Ryan, 1990) are the same at encoding and at test. Thus, the present research attempted to 
find three different kinds of extra-item context-dependency effects. Experiment 1 tested for 
the presence of a decision process context-dependency effect. Experiment 2 tested for the 
presence of a response process context-dependency effect. Experiments 3a and 3b tested for 
the presence of a physical (environmental) context-dependency effect. The general 
procedure in each of the experiments was the same. Participants engaged in three tasks. 
First, participants engaged in an encoding task. Second, participants engaged in a five-
minute distractor task in which they solved simple arithmetic equations. This served to 
separate the encoding task from the perceptual implicit memory tests. Third, participants 
engaged in one or more perceptual implicit memory tests. In all experiments, manipulations 
of context at encoding and test were done within-subjects. 
Experiment 1: Decision Context-Dependency 
If perceptual implicit memory relies on prior decisions made concerning the present 
stimulus, greater perceptual implicit memory should be found when the perceptual implicit 
memory test invokes the same decision processes at test that were invoked at encoding. That 
is, there should be a decision context-dependency. Of the four major models discussed in the 
introduction, the TAP framework addresses this kind of situation most directly. The 
proposed view predicts something more than the TAP framework. The TAP framework 
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states that perceptual implicit memory is affected by the match in perceptual processing 
between test and encoding (Roediger et al., 1989). To the extent that the decision comes 
after perceptual processing, there should not be an effect of type of decision. The proposed 
view predicts differences in the level of perceptual implicit memory even when the same 
level of perceptual processing is engaged in at encoding and test if there is a difference in the 
decision made between encoding and test. The proposed view predicts higher levels of 
perceptual implicit memory when the decision made concerning a stimulus at test matches 
the decision made at encoding. 
To test the prediction, participants engaged in two encoding tasks that required the 
same response (saying the word) but required two different kinds of decisions. In one 
encoding task, participants engaged in a word identification task. They saw words presented 
on a computer screen and indicated the word they saw by saying it aloud. In the other 
encoding task, participants engaged in a vocal lexical decision task. They saw words and 
nonwords presented on a computer screen and indicated the presence of a word by saying it 
aloud. Perceptual implicit memory was then measured for the words on a perceptual 
identification task and a vocal lexical decision task. It should be noted that nonwords did not 
appear during the block of the encoding task in which participants engaged in the word 
identification task. Because participants engaged in the same amount of perceptual 
processing (and performed the same response) for both tasks at encoding, the TAP 
framework does not predict a difference in later perceptual implicit memory between the 
encoding tasks on either test. The proposed decision view does predict a difference in 
perceptual implicit memory-higher levels of perceptual implicit memory should be found 
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when the same decision was made at encoding and at test (when the tasks at encoding and 
test are either both word identification or both lexical decision). 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Participants were 32 undergraduate students enrolled in introductory psychology 
courses. They received extra credit for their participation. Decision at encoding and at test 
was manipulated within-subjects. 
Stimuli 
A pool of 120 nouns from Roediger, Weldon, Stadler, and Reigler (1992, Experiment 
3) was divided into four sets of 30 words each such that the sets were approximately equal 
along the dimension of reportability on a perceptual identification test as assessed by an 
earlier study (Crabb & Dark, 1999a). For each participant, 60 of these words appeared in the 
initial encoding task. Thirty of the words appeared in each of the encoding conditions for 
each participant. The other 60 words were used as the baseline (or new) words in the 
perceptual implicit memory tasks. Words were counterbalanced such that each word 
appeared as an old and new word an equal number of times. Fifty-three other words were 
also presented as filler words. Forty-three appeared as filler words in the encoding task and 
10 were used as filler words in the perceptual identification task (5 of these 10 were used as 
fillers in the lexical decision test). In addition, 161 pronounceable nonwords were presented 
during the encoding and lexical decision tasks. Thirty-six appeared as fillers during the 
lexical decision condition of the encoding task and 125 appeared on the lexical decision task. 
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Apparatus 
The Micro Experimental Laboratory Professional software (Schneider, 1988) was 
used to display the stimuli for all tasks on a Pentium computer. A condenser microphone and 
response box were used to register when a verbal response was made. An experimenter 
recorded verbal accuracy. All stimuli were presented as white characters on a black 
background. Participants were seated approximately 40 cm from the monitor. 
Procedure 
Participants were told that they were taking part in an experiment to determine their 
ability to make decisions about briefly presented stimuli. Participants engaged in four tasks; 
the initial encoding task, a math filler task, and two perceptual implicit memory tasks: 
perceptual identification and lexical decision. At the end of the experiment, participants 
were debriefed as to the true purpose of the experiment. 
Encoding Task. Participants were presented two blocks of 72 trials. On each trial a 
fixation (++) was presented for 200 ms, followed by a stimulus for 500 ms. There was a 500 
ms intertrial interval. In order to guard against potential primacy and recency effects, the 
first and last six trials of each block were buffers. The remaining 60 trials in each block were 
presented in a random order. For one block of trials, the 60 trials consisted of 30 words that 
later served as the old words on the perceptual implicit memory tasks and 30 pronounceable 
nonwords. During this block, participants were instructed to search for words and to indicate 
the presence of a word by saying it aloud. For the other block of trials, the 60 trials consisted 
of 30 words that later served as the old words on the perceptual implicit memory tasks and 30 
other filler words. Participants were instructed to read the words aloud. Order of the blocks 
was counterbalanced across subjects. No feedback was given during the encoding task. 
23 
Math task. Following the encoding task, participants engaged in a S-minute math 
task. Participants were required to determine whether simple arithmetic equations (e.g., 
2+2=5) are true. Each problem was presented on the computer screen and participants were 
required to respond by key press as quickly and accurately as possible ("1" for "true" and "2" 
for "false"). The next problem was presented immediately after the response. The math task 
served as a distraction task designed to clear working memory and to disconnect the 
subsequent memory test from the encoding task. 
Following the math task, participants engaged in the perceptual identification and 
lexical decision tasks. The order of the two tasks was counterbalanced across participants. 
Perceptual Identification. In the perceptual identification task, 70 trials were 
presented. Each trial began with a fixation point (++) for 500 ms. Following fixation, a 
word was presented for 33 ms. Each word was followed by a mask, which consisted of a row 
of Xs and which remained on until a response was made. Because perceptual identification 
is a difficult task, the first 10 trials were inserted as practice trials before participants 
encountered the critical trials. Thus, the first 10 trials contained filler words that were not 
analyzed. Of the remaining 60 trials, 30 were the old words from the encoding task (15 fi-om 
each encoding condition) and 30 were new words. Participants were instructed to name the 
words aloud and the experimenter recorded their responses. 
Lexical decision. In the lexical decision task, 130 trials were presented. Each trial 
began with a fixation point for 200 ms. Following fixation, either a word or a pronounceable 
nonword was presented for 500 ms. A1500 ms blank screen was then presented. Responses 
that were not made within 2000 ms after the stimulus was presented were counted as errors. 
The first 10 trials were inserted as practice trial before participants encountered the critical 
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trials and were not analyzed. Of the remaining 120 trials, 30 were old words from the 
encoding task (15 from each condition), 30 were new words, and 60 were pronounceable 
nonwords. Participants were instructed to determine if the stimulus on each trial was a word. 
If the stimulus was a word, participants were instructed to say the word as quickly as they 
could. An experimenter recorded the accuracy of their responses and the computer recorded 
latency of their responses. 
Results 
An alpha level of .05 was used for all analyses. 
Encoding Tasks 
Because the standard view predicts differences in the level of perceptual implicit 
memory as a function of the proportion of words at encoding whose lexical representations 
are accessed (e.g.. Mulligan, 1997; Weldon, 1991), performance at encoding was analyzed in 
terms of the proportion of critical words (the words that were later tested on the perceptual 
implicit memory tests) overtly identified at encoding. Because the set of critical words 
overtly identified at encoding is necessarily a subset of the set of critical words lexically 
processed at encoding, the proportion of critical words overtly identified at encoding should 
be considered a conservative estimate of the actual proportion of critical words lexically 
processed. If the proportion of words identified at encoding between the two conditions is 
equivalent, the standard view predicts no difference in the level of later perceptual implicit 
memory. 
The proportion of overtly identified critical words in the word identification encoding 
task was .963 (§£=.008) and in the lexical-decision encoding task was .937 (S£ = .012). 
Although the proportion of overtly identified words was high in both conditions, it was 
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reliably higher in the word identification condition, t (31) = 2.27, SE = Oil, u = .030. The 
lower rate of overt identification in the lexical decision condition is not surprising because 
the decision that was required was more difficult than the decision in the word identification 
task. 
Perceptual Implicit Memory Tasks 
Perceptual Identification. The proportion of old words that were identified and the 
proportion of new words that were identified are shown in Table 1 for each of the encoding 
conditions. Perceptual implicit memory was indexed as a difference score by subtracting the 
Table 1. Performance on the Perceptual Identification Task in Experiment 1 as a 
Function of Encoding Task and Type of Word. 
Encoding Task 
Word Identification Lexical Decision 
Type of Word M SE M SE 
Old .60 .04 .63 .04 
New .46 .04 .46 .04 
Difference .14* .02 .17* .03 
* Reliably different from zero, c <.05. 
proportion of new words identified from the proportion of old words identified. There was 
no difference in the level of perceptual implicit memory as a fimction of decision at 
encoding, t (31) =-1.37,5E= .024, c = .180. However, as predicted by both the proposed 
and standard view, the level of perceptual implicit memory in both conditions was reliably 
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greater than chance, I (31) = 6.12, SE = 023, jj < ,001, and 1 (31) = 6.52, S£ = .027, p < .001, 
for the word identification and lexical decision encoding conditions, respectively. 
Lexical Decision. The proportion correct and mean reaction times for accurate 
responses to old words and to new words are shown in Table 2 for each of the encoding 
conditions. Perceptual implicit memory was indexed as a difference score by subtracting the 
reaction time to new words firom the reaction time to old words. As with perceptual 
identification, there was no difference in the level of perceptual implicit memory as a 
function of decision at encoding, t(31) = -.35, SE = 16.97, c = .731. As predicted by both the 
proposed and standard view, the level of perceptual implicit memory in both conditions was 
reliably greater than chance, t(31) = 3.41, SI = 9.80, e = 002 and t(31) = 1.87, SE = 14.72, g 
= .045, for the word identification and lexical decision encoding conditions, respectively. 
Because numerically more old than new words were correctly classified, there was no 
indication of a speed-accuracy tradeoff. 
Table 2. Mean Response Times and Proportion Correct on the Lexical Decision Task in 
Experiment 1 as a Function of Encoding Task and Type of Word. 
Encoding Task 
Word Identification Lexical Decision 
Type of Word M SB PC M SB PC 
Old 703 15 .94 709 15 .93 
New 737 14 .91 737 13 .91 
Difference 33* 12 27* 12 
• Reliably different from zero, <.05. 
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Discussion 
The findings of the this experiment do not support the proposed view of perceptual 
implicit memory. The proposed view predicted a reliable effect of type of decision at 
encoding on both the perceptual identification and lexical decision tasks, with higher levels 
of perceptual implicit memory when the decision at test matched the decision made at 
encoding. No effect of type of decision at encoding was found. There was evidence of 
perceptual implicit memory in all conditions, but the level of perceptual implicit memory did 
not depend on the match in decision processes between encoding and test. Further the lack 
of an effect was found with both measures of perceptual implicit memory: perceptual 
identification and lexical decision. 
Although there was a small but reliable difference in the proportion of words overtly 
identified at encoding between the two encoding tasks, there was no indication of an effect of 
encoding task on the magnitude of later perceptual implicit memory. However, identification 
was quite high in both encoding conditions. It is possible that the words that were not overtly 
identified during lexical decision did receive equivalent levels of perceptual/lexical 
processing, but just were not recognized as English words. Because of this, the standard 
view would not make a strong claim about the effect of the encoding conditions on the later 
perceptual implicit memory tasks. At most, the standard view would predict either no 
difference in the level of perceptual implicit memory (because identification was so high) or 
peiiiaps a slightly lower level of perceptual implicit memory (for both perceptual implicit 
memory tasks) for words initially presented m the lexical-decision encoding task. 
The failure to find an effect of decision process context-dependency on perceptual 
implicit memory would appear to support the standard view that perceptual implicit memory 
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reflects changes in a perceptual, lexical processing system. According to this view, the 
present results demonstrate that type of decision made about a stimulus at encoding does not 
appear to be a part of the memory trace underlying perceptual implicit memory. 
Although the standard view provides a straightforward account for the results in this 
experiment, the data also can be interpreted so that they fit with the proposed view. It is 
possible that the type of decision process is incorporated into the memory trace underlying 
perceptual implicit memory, but that the manipulation of type of decision process was not 
strong enough to elicit a measurable effect. Indeed, the decisions used in this experiment are 
quite similar. Perhaps the decision processes were not distinct enough to have differential 
effects on perceptual implicit memory. It is also possible that the rest of the context (e.g., the 
environmental and response contexts) was too similar between encoding and test and that the 
similarity masked any difference produced by the match or mismatch in decision process 
context. A more sensitive design in which the contexts are made as different as possible 
along as many dimensions as possible might provide a better test of whether reinstating the 
decision process context at test improves percepUial implicit memory. 
Although the explanations for the lack of a type of decision process context-
dependency effect discussed in the previous paragraph might be accurate, there is little 
support for them in the data because no evidence for context-dependency was found. If there 
was a decision process context-dependency effect but it was being masked by other factors, 
one would expect at least a trend in the data suggesting that such an effect was there. There 
was no such trend. The burden of proof is clearly on the proposed view. The most 
parsimonious account is that provided by the standard view. The proposed view must find 
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evidence of decision context-dependency in some experimental situation before its 
explanations for the lack of an effect in the present experiment should be considered. 
Experiment 2: Response Context-Dependency 
It is possible that making any decision at encoding improves later perceptual implicit 
memory. The memory trace might be affected by a previously made decision, without the 
exact decision process being incorporated into the memory trace. Future research might 
check to see if making ANY decision improves perceptual implicit memory. Forster and 
Davis (1984) presented evidence that when a word is the target of a response (and thus the 
focus of a decision) at encoding, higher levels of perceptual implicit memory were found 
than when a word was not the target of a response. However, the evidence consisted of a 
comparison of performance across two different experiments that differed along more 
dimensions than just whether or not the word was the target of a response. Thus, further 
research must determine if simply making a decision improves later perceptual implicit 
memory. While finding higher levels of perceptual implicit memory when a decision is 
made at encoding versus when no decision is made at encoding would still not support the 
kind of individual instance view proposed here, it also would not be predicted by the standard 
accounts of perceptual implicit memory. Indeed, finding that making a decision about a 
word at encoding improves perceptual implicit memory when the amount of perceptual 
processing is equivalent would cause problems for the standard view of perceptual implicit 
memory. 
Crabb and Dark (1999c) showed greater perceptual implicit memory when the 
response at encoding and at test were both vocal. At encoding, participants were presented 
words one at a time. In one condition, participants read aloud words that later appeared as 
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old words in a perceptual identification task. In another encoding condition, participants did 
not read aloud the words. In two different experiments (Experiments 1 & 2), higher levels of 
perceptual implicit memory (as measured by a perceptual identification task) were found 
when the words were read aloud at encoding. However, in another experiment (Experiment 
3) in which participants either did or did not press a key in response to a word at encoding, 
there was no increase in the level of perceptual implicit memory (as measured by a 
perceptual identification task) for words that had been responded to at encoding. 
One interpretation of this finding is that saying a word at encoding enhances the 
perceptual/lexical processing of the word, which in turn leads to better perceptual implicit 
memory. That is, saying a word allows the individual to hear the word, allowing for more 
perceptual/lexical processing than is possible when just silently reading the word or when 
pressing a key in response to the word. This interpretation would be in agreement with the 
standard view that perceptual implicit memory is the result of changes within a 
perceptual/lexical processing system. Although this interpretation might seem plausible, it 
relies upon finding an effect of hearing a word at encoding on a later visual perceptual 
implicit memory task. This is problematic because the lack of such cross-modal priming is a 
hallmark of perceptual implicit memory (Roediger & McDermott, 1993). 
A second interpretation is that saying the word at encoding left an articulatory 
memory trace that improved later perceptual implicit memory because a similar vocal 
response was required at test. This interpretation fits with the proposed view that the 
memory trace underlying perceptual implicit memory includes the response that was made to 
the stimulus. That is, the second interpretation is that the effect of vocal response observed 
by Crabb and Dark (1999c) is due to the match in response between encoding and test. The 
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second interpretation does not fit with the standard view because it posits an effect of 
nonperceptual/lexical processing at encoding on perceptual implicit memory. 
The two interpretations differ in terms of how they generalize to other types of 
response. For example, if the proposed view is correct, higher levels of perceptual implicit 
memory should be found when a manual response is made both at encoding and at test. The 
standard view does not predict such an effect if the same amount of perceptual processing 
occurs at encoding. The present experiment tests whether a response context-dependency 
effect can be found on a perceptual implicit memory test that requires a manual response and 
on a perceptual implicit memory test that requires a vocal response. 
To test for a response context-dependency effect on perceptual identification, at 
encoding participants engaged in a word identification task in two blocks of trials. During 
one block, participants identified words by saying them aloud. During the other block, 
participants identified words by writing them on a piece of paper. Perceptual implicit 
memory was then measured for the words on two perceptual implicit memory tasks: vocal 
percepmal identification (in which participants identified words by saying them aloud) and 
manual perceptual identification (in which participants identified words by writing them on a 
piece of paper). The proposed view predicts an effect of response modality at encoding 
(verbal and manual) on each type of task, with the highest perceptual implicit memory when 
the response at encoding and test match. Thus, on the one hand, perceptual implicit memory 
should be higher for words spoken at encoding when it is measured by a vocal perceptual 
identification task. On the other hand, perceptual implicit memory should be higher for 
words written at encoding when it is measured with a manual perceptual identification task. 
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Method 
Participants and Design 
Participants were 32 undergraduate students enrolled in introductory psychology 
courses. They received extra credit for their participation. Response modality at encoding 
and response modality at test were manipulated within-subjects. 
Stimuli 
The same pool of 120 words from the decision context-dependency experiment was 
used. For each participant, 60 of these words appeared in the initial encoding task. Thirty of 
the words appeared in each of the encoding conditions for each participant. The other 60 
words were used as the baseline (or new) words in the perceptual implicit memory tasks. 
Words were counterbalanced such that each word appeared as an old and new word an equal 
number of times. Eighty-four other words were presented during the encoding task, 42 per 
block. Ten other words were used as fillers in the perceptual implicit memory tasks. 
Apparatus 
The apparatus was identical to that of Experiment 1. 
Procedure 
Participants were told that they were taking part in an experiment to determine their 
ability to make decisions about briefly presented stimuli. Participants engaged in four tasks: 
the initial encoding task, a S-min. math task, and two perceptual implicit memory tests: vocal 
perceptual identification and manual perceptual identification. At the end of the experiment, 
participants were debriefed as to the true purpose of the experiment. 
Encoding Task. Participants were presented two blocks of 72 words. On each trial a 
tone sounded for 200 ms to alert participants that a new trial was starting. After 500 ms, a 
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fixation (++) was presented for 500 ms, followed by a word for 500 ms. There was a 4000 
ms intertrial interval, to allow time for participants to write the words when they were in the 
block that required them to do so. In order to guard against potential primacy and recency 
effects, the first and last six words of each block were buffer words. Of the remaining 60 
words, 30 were critical words that served as the old words on the perceptual implicit memory 
tasks and 30 were filler words. 
Participants were instructed to identify the words as they were presented. For one 
block, participants were instructed to identify the presented word by saying it aloud. An 
experimenter recorded their responses on a response sheet. In the other block, participants 
were instructed to identify the presented words by writing the words on a different response 
sheet. Order of the blocks was counterbalanced across subjects. No feedback was given 
during the encoding task. 
Math task. The math task was the same as the one used in Experiment 1. 
Vocal perceptual identification. The vocal perceptual identification task was the 
same as the perceptual identification task used in Experiment 1. 
Manual perceptual identification. The manual perceptual identification task was 
similar to the perceptual identification task used in Experiment 1, except that participants 
identified words by writing them on a response sheet. If participants did not know what 
word was presented, they wrote a "?" on the response sheet. After writing their response, 
participants pressed the space bar to continue to the next trial. 
Results 
An alpha level of .05 was used in all analyses. 
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Encoding Task 
As in Experiment 1, performance at encoding was analyzed in terms of the proportion 
of critical words (the words that were later tested on the perceptual implicit memory tests) 
overtly identified at encoding. As expected participants overtly identified a high proportion 
of words and there was no difference in the proportion of words overtly identified between 
when participants read the words aloud (M = -987, SE = .005) and when participants wrote 
the words (M = -992, SE = .003), t (31) = -1.04, SE = .005, e = .305. Because participants 
identified equivalent proportions of words in the two encoding conditions, the standard view 
would predict no difference in performance on the perceptual implicit memory tasks as a 
function of encoding condition. 
Perceptual Identification 
The proportion of old words that were identified and the proportion of new words that 
were identified are shown in Table 2 for each of the conditions. Perceptual implicit memory 
Table 3. Performance on the Perceptual Identification Tasks in Experiment 2 as a 
Function of Response Modality at Encoding and Response Modality at Test. 
Response Modality at Encoding 
Vocal Written New 
Response Modality M SE M SE M SE 
at Test 
Vocal .63 .04 .65 .04 .47 .04 
Written .68 .04 .64 .04 .48 .04 
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was indexed as a difference score by subtracting the proportion of new words identified fi-om 
the proportion of old words identified. The difference scores are shown in Figure 2^. An 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with response modality at encoding and response modality 
at test as within-subjects variable failed to find reliable main effects of response modality at 
encoding, £(1,31) = 0.57, MSE = .011, e = .457, or response modality at test, F (1, 31) = 
0.25. MSE = .015. D = .624. 
The interaction between the two variables was marginally reliable, F (1,31) = 2.93, MSE = 
.012, g = .098, but the direction of the interaction was opposite that predicted by the proposed 
view. As predicted by both the proposed and standard view, the level of perceptual implicit 
memory was reliably greater than chance in all conditions, all t's > 4. 
0.3 n 
0.25 -
0.05 -
Response 
Modality at 
Encoding 
•Vocal 
•Written 
Vocal Written 
Response Modality at Test 
Figure 2. Old-new difference scores on perceptual identification in 
Experiment 2 as a function of response modality at encoding and 
response modality at test. 
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Discussion 
The findings of this experiment do not support the proposed decision view of 
perceptual implicit memory. The proposed view predicted a reliable interaction between the 
modality of the response at encoding and the modality of the response at test, with higher 
levels of perceptual implicit memory when the response modality at test matches the 
response modality at encoding (see Figure 1). No reliable interaction was found. Not only 
did the level of perceptual implicit memory not depend on the match in response modality 
between encoding and test, but a numerically greater level of perceptual implicit memory 
was found when the response modality at encoding and the response modality at test did not 
match. 
The failure to find a response context-dependency effect on perceptual implicit 
memory would appear to support the standard view that perceptual implicit memory reflects 
changes in a perceptual, lexical processing system. According to this view, the present 
results demonstrate that the modality (and perhaps any aspect) of the response made to a 
stimulus does not appear to be a part of the memory trace underlying perceptual implicit 
memory. The standard view (and the TAP view in particular) predicted similar levels of 
perceptual implicit memory among the conditions because the amount of perceptual 
processing at encoding was similar between the two encoding conditions. This was what was 
found. 
Although no effect of response modality was found, the level of perceptual implicit 
memory in this experiment was quite high when compared with other studies that have used 
vocal perceptual identification with the same set of words but did not require an overt 
response fix)m participants at encoding (Crabb & Daric, 1999b; the silent conditions in Crabb 
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& Dark, 1999c). No overt response was required at encoding because the critical words were 
not targets and difference scores in the vocal perceptual identification task ranged between 
.06 and .10. In the present research (including the decision and environmental context-
dependency experiments) and in the vocal conditions in Crabb and Dark (1999c) in which 
participants did make an overt response at encoding, difference scores ranged between .15 
and .20. This increase in the size of the difference scores might indicate, as suggested by 
Forster and Davis (1984), that making an overt response at encoding does improve perceptual 
implicit memory. However, the data do not reveal why overt responding at encoding 
improves later perceptual implicit memory, and, in fact, other studies have shown that the 
type of response at encoding has no direct effect on later perceptual implicit memory (e.g., 
Downes, et al., 1996; MacDonald & MacLeod, 1998). 
The apparent increase does not appear to be because the response itself is part of what 
is stored in the memory trace, as would be suggested by the proposed view and other 
individual instance theories (e.g., Logan 1988,1990). If that were the case, there should 
have been a response modality context-dependency effect. Rather, the apparent overt 
response effect could be indicative of the importance of the word at encoding. Saying or 
producing a word might make the word important (the target of decisional processing). This 
might explain why Crabb and Dark (1999c) found an effect of some response versus no 
response at encoding, but there was no effect of the type of response (i.e., response modality) 
in this experiment. That is, the results of this experiment and Crabb and Dark (1999c) might 
indicate that making a decision about a word at encoding does have an effect on the memory 
representations underlying perceptual implicit memory, but without the specifics of the 
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decision (e.g., the kind of decision made, the type of response made) being incorporated into 
the representation. A potential mechanism for this is presented in the general discussion. 
Experiment 3a: Environmental Context-Dependency—Perceptual Identification 
The role of physical (or environmental) context in at least some forms of explicit 
memory is well established. A large number of studies have demonstrated that recall 
performance is best when the physical context at test is the same as the physical context at 
encoding (see Smith, 1988, for a review). The improvement in recall performance when the 
physical context at encoding and test match is called environmental context-dependency. 
The context-dependency is assumed to reflect the retrieval of an episodic memory trace. If 
perceptual implicit memory depends on retrieval of an episodic memory trace, then it seems 
that it too should demonstrate a similar context-dependency. 
The results of studies on context-dependency effects in perceptual implicit memory 
are not straightforward (see Tenpenny, 1995, for a review). An early study showed that 
when words are studied alone, rather than as part of a meaningful paragraph, higher levels of 
perceptual implicit memory are found when the perceptual implicit memory test presents 
words alone (Oliphant, 1983). Although the study was originally interpreted in terms of a 
context-dependency effect (words alone or in a paragraph at encoding and words alone at 
test), a recent study suggests that the effect more likely is due to the lower level of perceptual 
processing that words receive when they are presented m a sentence compared to when they 
are presented alone (Masson & MacLeod, 1996). 
Many studies that have found context-dependency in perceptual implicit memory 
have used paradigms in which word-pairs are presented together at encoding and test (e.g., 
Graf & Schacter, 1985; Schacter & Graf, 1986). Context is manipulated in these studies by 
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pairing the word at test with either the same word or a new word. These studies often (but 
not always) find higher levels of perceptual implicit memory when the word is paired with 
the same word at encoding and test. However, it is possible that such manipulations are more 
than just a manipulation of environmental context, the manipulation might be affecting the 
kind of processing that the target word receives at encoding and test. That is, such a 
manipulation might affect the kind or amount of conceptual vs. perceptual processing that a 
word receives at encoding and test. If this is true, the TAP and Masson and MacLeod (1992) 
frameworks would explain the effects in terms of the amount or kind of processing rather 
than in terms of context-dependency. 
Smith, Heath, and Vela (1990) found an effect of environmental context-dependency 
on homophone spelling (a perceptual implicit memory task). In one of two rooms, 
participants heard or read word pairs in which the first word biased participants to think of a 
lower frequency spelling of a homophone (e.g., vegetable-BEET). Participants then either 
went to the other room or went back into their original room and engaged in a task in which 
they were to spell homophones they heard on an audiotape. Smith et al. found that 
participants were more likely to spell the homophones with the lower frequency spelling 
when they were in the same room than when they were in a different room. Although 
intriguing. Smith et al.'s results are not conclusive evidence of an effect of environmental 
context on perceptual implicit memory because the homophone spelling task is not a 
common perceptual implicit memory task and might be vulnerable to explicit contamination 
(i.e., participants might explicitly remember the presentation of the lower frequency spelling 
and spell the word in the same maimer). Because of the problems with the Smith et al. study. 
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a stronger case for an environmental context-dependency effects require that the effect be 
found with a well accepted perceptual implicit memory task. 
Mori and Graf (1996) attempted to find an environmental context-dependency effect 
in perceptual implicit memory, as measured by perceptual identification, in four 
experiments; they failed to find an effect in any of the experiments. At encoding, 
participants saw words presented on a colored background. For each word, participants were 
required to determine how appropriate the background color was to the concept represented 
by the word (e.g., banana was presented on a yellow background or swan was presented on a 
green background). At test, participants engaged in a perceptual identification task. Words 
were presented with either the same or different color background. Because the encoding 
task encouraged participants to integrate the background color with the word, Mori and Graf 
expected to find an environmental context-dependency effect. They did not. 
The proposed view of perceptual implicit memory predicts an environmental context-
dependency effect when the physical context is a part of the decision processes at encoding 
and test. Thus, if the physical context in which a word appears at encoding is important in 
the decision an individual makes at encoding, reinstating that physical context at test should 
increase the level of perceptual implicit memory. The Mori and Graf (1996) study appears to 
show that a context-dependency effect is not found, even if the environmental context is 
important to the decisions made at encoding. However, the kind of decision being made 
required participants to engage in deliberative, elaborative processing of the words (i.e., they 
had to consider the characteristics of the underlying concept to make their decision). Thus, it 
is likely that the environmental context was incorporated into the memory trace produced by 
this deliberative, elaborative processing. Because perceptual implicit memory is insensitive 
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to changes in this kind of elaborative, conceptual processing (e.g., levels-of-processing 
manipulations do not effect perceptual implicit memory), it is not clear that the lack of an 
effect in the studies by Mori and Graf is due to a lack of environmental context-dependency. 
That is, the decision participants engaged in at test might not have used the memory 
representations produced by the encoding task and because they did not use these 
representations, they were not affected by differences in the environmental context. 
The proposed view predicts an environmental context-dependency effect, particularly 
when the decision process engaged in at encoding involves an early, nondeliberative kind of 
processing, unlike that required in Mori and Graf (1996). To test this prediction, participants 
viewed white words on either a red or blue background at encoding. In one encoding 
condition, participants were instructed to say the word only if it was on a blue background. 
In the other encoding condition, participants were instructed to say the word only if it was on 
a red background. In this way, the color of the background (the physical context in which the 
word appeared) was important to the decision that the participants made (to say the word or 
to not say the word). Perceptual implicit memory was tested using perceptual identification. 
The proposed view predicts higher levels of perceptual implicit memory when the 
background at test is the same color as the background in which the words were presented at 
encoding. 
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Method 
Participants and Design 
Participants were 32 undergraduate students enrolled in introductory psychology 
courses. They received extra credit for their participation. The background color at encoding 
and the background color at test were manipulated within subjects 
Stimuli 
The same pool of 120 words from Experiment I was used. For each participant, 60 of 
these words appeared in the initial encoding task. Thirty of the words appeared in each of the 
encoding conditions for each participant. The other 60 words were used as the baseline (or 
new) words in the perceptual identification task. Words were counterbalanced such that each 
word appears as an old and new word an equal number of times. Another 94 words that were 
not analyzed were presented as filler words. Eighty-four appeared as fillers in the encoding 
task and 10 appeared as practice during the perceptual identification task. 
Apparatus 
The apparatus was identical to that used in Experiment 1. The color of the 
background was controlled by selecting the blue and red background choices in the MEL 
software package (Schneider, 1988). 
Procedure 
Participants were told that they were taking part in an experiment to determine their 
ability to make decisions about briefly presented stimuli. Participants engaged in three tasks; 
the initial encoding task, a 5-min. math task, and a perceptual implicit memory task. At the 
end of the experiment, participants were debriefed as to the true purpose of the experiment. 
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Encoding Task. Participants were presented with two blocks of 72 words. Each 
word was presented for 500 ms with either a blue or a red background (50% of trials in each 
block were of each color) with a 500 ms intertrial interval. In order to guard against potential 
primacy and recency effects, the first and last six trials of each block were filler words. The 
remaining 60 trials in each block were presented in a random order. Of these words, 30 were 
critical words that were tested later on the perceptual identification task. The other thirty 
words were filler words. In each block, the critical (to be tested) words were presented only 
on trials containing the background color that indicated a response was to be made. During 
one block of the encoding task, participants were instructed to say the word if it was 
presented with a red background and on the other block, participants were instructed to say 
they word if it was presented with a blue background. The order of the two blocks was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
Math task. The math task was the same as that used in Experiment 1. 
Perceptual Identification. The perceptual identification task was the same as that 
used in Experimentl except half of the words were shown with a blue background and half of 
the words were shown with a red background. 
Results 
An alpha level of .05 was used in all analyses. Twelve participants who did not 
identify any words in one of the perceptual identification blocks were replaced. 
Encoding Task 
As in Experiment 1, performance at encoding was analyzed in terms of the proportion 
of critical words (the words that were later tested on the perceptual implicit memory tests) 
overtly identified at encoding. Almost all words were overtly identified at encoding and 
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there was no difference in the proportion of words overtly identified between when the words 
were presented with a red background (M ~ -986, SE = .005) and when the words were 
presented with a blue background (M = -986, SE = 005), t (31) = 0.00, SE = .004, g = .999. 
Because participants identified equivalent proportions of words in the two encoding 
conditions, the standard view would predict no difference in performance on the perceptual 
implicit memory tasks as a function of encoding condition. 
Perceptual Identification 
The proportion of old words that were identified and the proportion of new words that 
were identified are shown in Table 3 for each of the encoding conditions. Perceptual implicit 
memory was indexed as a difference score by subtracting the proportion of new words 
Table 4. Performance on the Perceptual Identification Tasks in Experiment 3a as a 
Function of Color at Encoding and Color at Test. 
Color at Encoding 
Red Blue New 
Color at Test M SE M SE M SE 
Red .26 .04 .25 .04 .16 .03 
Blue .46 .05 .45 .05 .29 .03 
identified fix)m the proportion of old words identified. The difference scores are shown in 
Figure 3. An ANOVA with color at encoding and color at test as within-subjects variables 
showed a reliable main effect of color at test, £(1,31) = 6.66, MSB = .026, = .015, with 
higher perceptual implicit memory for words shown in the blue background. The main effect 
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of color at encoding was not reliable, E (1,31) = .72, MSE = .007, g = .402. Critically, the 
interaction between the two variables was not reliable, F (1, 31) = 0.00, MSE = .005,2 = 
.999. Thus, there was no indication of a context-dependency effect (see Figure 1). As 
predicted by both the proposed and standard view, the level of perceptual implicit memory as 
reliably greater than chance in all conditions, all t's > 3. 
The main effect of color at test on perceptual identification was unexpected. In fact, 
as suggested in Table 4, fewer words overall were identified when the words were presented 
with a red background, t (31) = 6.99, SE = .023, g < .001. 
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Figure 3. Old-new difference scores on perceptual identification 
in Experiment 3a as a function of color at encoding and color at 
test. 
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Discussion 
The findings of this experiment do not support the proposed view of perceptual 
implicit memory. The proposed view predicted a reliable interaction between the color of the 
background at encoding and the color of the background at test, with higher levels of 
perceptual implicit memory when the background color at test matched the background color 
at encoding. No interaction was found. The level of perceptual implicit memory did not 
depend on the match in background color between encoding and test, even though the color 
at encoding was important to the decision. 
The failure to find an effect of environmental context-dependency on perceptual 
implicit memory would appear to support the standard view that perceptual implicit memory 
reflects changes in a perceptual, lexical processing system. According to this view, the 
present results demonstrate that background information that occurred when a stimulus is 
presented does not appear to be a part of the memory trace underlying perceptual implicit 
memory. The standard view (and the TAP view in particular) predicted similar levels of 
perceptual implicit memory among the conditions because the amount of perceptual 
processing at encoding was similar between the two encoding conditions. This was what was 
found. 
The main effect of color at test was not predicted by either the proposed view or the 
standard view. Indeed, the literature does not suggest that higher perceptual implicit memory 
should be found when a blue background rather than a red background is used at test. A 
closer look at the results, however, suggests that the color at test is not affecting the level of 
perceptual implicit memory directly. Rather, the reliable difference in the proportion of new 
words identified suggests that the red background appeared to affect the overall performance 
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on the task. Fewer words were identified with the red background at test than with the blue 
background, suggesting that there were differences in the perceptual quality of the 
information available to the participants. If true, then the two test conditions might not be 
equally sensitive to perceptual implicit memory. Yet, even with a sensitivity difference, the 
proposed view predicts a context-dependency effect. 
As stated in the introduction, studies that have found context-dependency using 
paradigms in which word-pairs are presented together at encoding and test are potentially 
contaminated by differences in the type of processing among the words. Experiment 3a did 
not use this kind of manipulation of context and there should not have been processing 
differences. Thus, it was, in a sense, a purer test of environmental context-dependency than 
many other studies. In this purer test, no evidence of environmental context-dependency was 
found. This finding agrees with the findings of Mori and Graf (1996) that no extra-item 
integrated context-dependency is found. The present finding also suggest that the failure of 
Mori and Graf (1996) to find a context-dependency effect was not due to the type of decision 
participants engaged in at encoding, but rather illustrates that perceptual implicit memory 
does not exhibit such environmental context-dependency effects. 
Before completely ruling out the possibility of an environmental context-dependency 
effect on perceptual implicit memory, another experiment was run to test for another possible 
explanation for the lack of environmental context-dependency on perceptual implicit 
memory. 
Experiment 3b: Environmental Context-Dependency—Word-Stem Completion 
One possible explanation for the lack of an environmental context-dependency in the 
previous experiment is that presenting the entire word in perceptual identification 
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"overshadowed" a small, but real, context-dependency effect. The "overshadowing" 
hypothesis has been used as an explanation for why context-dependency effects are not often 
found with recognition (in which the word is presented to the participant), but are often 
shown in free recall (in which the word is not presented to the participant) (Smith, 1988). 
According to this hypothesis, presentation of the word is such a strong memory retrieval cue 
that any effect of context-dependency is overpowered. It is possible that the same occurred 
with perceptual identification. The memory trace underlying perceptual implicit memory test 
performance might include the environmental context, but the benefit of the reinstatement of 
environmental context might not be enough to be shown when perceptual identification is 
used as the perceptual implicit memory task. 
To test whether "overshadowing" might have caused the lack of a context-
dependency effect in the environmental context-dependency—perceptual identification 
experiment, this experiment used word stem completion as the perceptual implicit memory 
task. In word stem completion, only three-letter stems are presented to participants during 
the task and participants are instructed to complete the stem with the first word that comes to 
mind. Because the full word is not presented as it is in perceptual identification, there should 
be no overshadowing. Thus, if a context-dependency effect is found, it would suggest that 
the lack of an effect with perceptual identification might have been due to an 
"overshadowing" effect and that the memory trace underlying perceptual implicit memory 
does include the environmental context. If a context-dependency effect is not found, it would 
suggest that the lack of an effect with perceptual identification was not due to 
"overshadowing" and the memory trace underlying perceptual implicit memory does not 
include the environmental context. 
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Method 
Participants and Design 
Participants were 32 undergraduate students enrolled in introductory psychology 
courses. They received extra credit for their participation. The background color at encoding 
and the background color at test were manipulated within subjects. 
Procedure 
Participants were told that they were taking part in an experiment to determine their 
ability to make decisions about briefly presented stimuli. Participants engaged in three tasks; 
the initial encoding task, a S-min. math task, and a perceptual implicit memory test: word 
stem completion. The apparatus, stimuli, encoding task, and math task were the same as 
those used in Experiment 3a. At the end of the experiment, participants were debriefed as to 
the true purpose of the experiment. 
Word Stem Completion. In the word stem completion test, 130 trials were presented. 
Each trial consisted of a three-letter word stem presented on the computer screen until a 
response was made. A 2500 ms intertial interval was used. As with the perceptual 
identification task, the first 10 trials were inserted as practice trials. Thus, the first 10 trials 
contained stems that were not analyzed. Of the remaining 120 trials, 60 contained stems that 
could be completed by old words from the encoding task (30 firom each background color 
condition) and 60 contained stems that could be completed by new words. Participants were 
instructed to say the first word they could think of to complete the stem. Half of the stems 
were presented with a blue background and half were presented with a red background. 
Because participants could adopt an explicit retrieval strategy in word stem completion 
(causing the task to no longer be a pure perceptual implicit memory task), during debriefing 
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participants were asked three questions to determine the degree to which they were aware of 
the connection between the encoding and word stem completion task and to determine if they 
used an explicit retrieval strategy. Participants were asked: a) if they noticed any connection 
between the first and last task, b) if they noticed that some of the stems could be completed 
with words from the first task, and c) if they tried to complete the stems with words they 
remembered from the first task. 
Results 
An alpha level of .05 was used in all analyses. 
Encoding Task 
As in the previous experiments, performance at encoding was analyzed in terms of 
the proportion of critical words (the words that were later tested on the perceptual implicit 
memory tests) overtly identified at encoding. Ahnost all the words were overtly identified 
and there was no difference in the proportion of words overtly identified between when the 
words were presented with a red background (M = .980, S£ = .007) and when the words 
were presented with a blue background (M = -990, gE = .007), t (31) = -1.62, SE = .006, g = 
.118. Because participants identified equivalent proportions of words in the two encoding 
conditions, the standard view would predict no difference in performance on the perceptual 
implicit memory tasks as a function of encoding condition. 
Word Stem CompletioD 
The proportion of stems completed with old words and the proportion of stems 
completed with new words are shown in Table 4 for each of the conditions. There was no 
difference in the proportion of overall words identified, as there was with perceptual 
identification. Perceptual implicit memory was indexed as a difference score by subtracting 
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Table 5. Performance on the Word stem Completion Task in Experiment 3b as a 
Function of Color at Encoding and Color at Test 
Color at Encoding 
Red Blue New 
Color at Test M SE M SE M SE 
Red .39 .02 .39 .02 .18 .01 
Blue .36 .02 .35 .02 .21 .02 
the proportion of stems completed with new words from the proportion of words completed 
with old words. The difference scores are shown in Figure 4. An ANOVA with color at 
encoding and color at test as within-subjects variables showed a reliable main effect of color 
at test, E(l, 31) = 5.67, MSE = .025, e = .024. The main effect of color at encoding was not 
H 0.25 
5 0.15 
•6 0.05 
Color at 
Encoding 
•Red 
•Blue 
Red Blue 
Color at Test 
Figure 4. Old-new difference scores on word-stem completion In 
Experiment 3b as a function of color at encoding and color at test 
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reliable, F (1,31) = 0.21, MSE = .006, g = .651. Critically, the interaction between the two 
variables was not reliable, £ (1, 31) = 0.02, MSE = .008, g = .897. As predicted by both the 
proposed and standard view, the level of perceptual implicit memory was reliably greater 
than chance in all conditions, all t's > 5. Nineteen participants reported that they were aware 
of a connection between the encoding and word stem completion test. Twenty-eight 
participants reported that they were aware that some of the words on the word stem 
completion test had also appeared on the encoding task. Eleven participants reported that 
they consciously attempted to complete some of the stems with words that they remembered 
from the encoding task. 
Discussion 
The findings of this experiment do not support the proposed view of perceptual 
implicit memory. The proposed view predicted a reliable interaction between the color of the 
background at encoding and the color of the background at test, with higher levels of 
perceptual implicit memory when the background color at test matched the background color 
at encoding. No interaction was found. The level of perceptual implicit memory did not 
depend on the match in background color between encoding and test. 
The failure to find an effect of environmental context-dependency on perceptual 
implicit memory would appear to support the standard view that perceptual implicit memory 
reflects changes in a perceptual, lexical processing system. According to this view, the 
present results demonstrate that background information that occurred when a stimulus is 
presented does not appear to be a part of the memory trace underlying perceptual implicit 
memory. The standard view (and the TAP view in particular) predicted similar levels of 
perceptual implicit memory among the conditions because the amount of perceptual 
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processing at encoding was similar between the two encoding conditions. This was what was 
found. 
The main effect of color at test was not predicted by either the proposed view or the 
standard view and cannot be attributed to overall differences in overall performance at test. 
Indeed, the effect of color at test is opposite that found in Experiment 3a, which examined 
environmental context-dependency with a perceptual identification test. The main effect of 
color at test appears to reflect the fact that stems were completed with old words just a bit 
more when the background was red and stems were completed with new words just a bit less 
when the background was red. Why this occurred is a puzzle because the literature does not 
suggest that higher perceptual implicit memory should be found when a red background 
rather than a blue background is used at test. 
The findings of this experiment suggest that the lack of a context-dependency effect 
with perceptual identification was not due to an "overshadowing" effect fi-om the 
presentation of the entire word in perceptual identification. Along with the Mori and Graf 
(1996) study, the present results strongly suggest that the representations underlying 
perceptual implicit memory are not environmentally context dependent. This is in contrast to 
the memory representations underlying explicit memory, which do seem to be context 
dependent. Indeed, the 11 participants in the present experiment who reported using an 
explicit strategy of consciously attempting to recall words to complete the word stems, 
showed a slight indication of a context-dependency effect (see Appendix B for the analyses). 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Conclusions from Current Research 
The current research was designed to test die view that perceptual implicit memory 
reflects decision memory. Taken together, the results provide no support for the proposed 
view. The proposed view predicted that perceptual implicit memory would be higher when 
the decision invoked by the perceptual implicit memory task matched the decision produced 
at encoding. No evidence for such a decision context-dependency was found. The proposed 
view predicted that perceptual implicit memory would be higher when the response required 
by the perceptual implicit memory task matched the response produced at encoding. No 
evidence for such a response context-dependency was found. The proposed view predicted 
that perceptual implicit memory would be higher when the color of the background in which 
a word appeared in the perceptual implicit memory task matched the decision-relevant color 
of the background in which a word appeared in at encoding. No evidence for such an 
environmental context-dependency was found. The failure to find any of the effects 
predicted by the proposed decision view strongly suggests that the view is wrong. 
The results of the current research provide support for the standard view of perceptual 
implicit memory. According to the standard view, perceptual implicit memory reflects 
changes within a perceptual, lexical processing system. Thus, only manipulations at 
encoding that affect the processing within that system should have an effect on a later 
perceptual implicit memory task. The encoding manipulations used in the experiments in the 
current research should not have affected the processing within the perceptual, lexical system 
according to any of the four frameworks discussed in the introduction. Because of this, the 
standard view predicted reliable levels of perceptual implicit memory in all encoding 
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conditions, but no differences in the level of perceptual implicit among the encoding 
conditions. This prediction held in all experiments. In each case, there were reliable levels 
of implicit memory, with no difference in the levels of perceptual implicit memory among 
the encoding conditions. 
The levels of perceptual implicit memory were equivalent across conditions in each 
experiment, but they were also quite high compared with previous studies that used the same 
set of words (Crabb & Dark, 1999a,b,c). While the current research does not clearly 
delineate why the level of perceptual implicit memory was high, there are some intriguing 
possibilities. Because an overt response was made to all words at encoding, it is possible that 
the high level of perceptual implicit memory in the current experiments reflects the impact of 
making an overt response at encoding. This would be in agreement with previous research 
demonstrating that making a task-relevant overt response at encoding does improve later 
perceptual implicit memory (Crabb & Dark, 1999c; Forster & Davis, 1984). It also is 
possible that the high levels of perceptual implicit memory reflect the fact that words were 
the target of decisional processing at encoding. That is, saying words (or writing them) at 
encoding makes the word a target of a decision. Perhaps the status of the words as decision 
targets in the current research led to the high levels of perceptual implicit memory. Indeed, 
in the previous studies that have shown an effect of response versus no response at encoding, 
the words that were not responded to at encoding (and that demonstrated lower levels of 
perceptual implicit memory) also were not the target of decisional processing at encoding. 
They were distractors. To discriminate between these two explanations, future research must 
unconfound response and word status (target or not a target of decisional processing). Both 
of these possibilities would suggest that the standard view might not do a complete job of 
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explaining perceptual implicit memory. However, neither provides evidence for the 
proposed view, at least as currently stated. 
Is An Episodic Theory Appropriate? 
The proposed view posited that perceptual implicit memory was a type of episodic 
memory. The results of the current research failed to find support for the proposed view. 
The results of the current research are consistent with the standard view that perceptual 
implicit memory reflects changes within a perceptual, lexical system. As discussed in the 
introduction, there are at least four models that propose the standard view. These models can 
be classified by whether they posit episodic or abstract representations underlying perceptual 
implicit memory. The results of the current research can be interpreted as suggesting that 
episodic models (such as the TAP, interpretation, and individual instance views), which posit 
that perceptual implicit memory is the result of retrieving information tied to a specific prior 
event or episode, are not appropriate models of perceptual implicit memory. Rather, the 
results of the current research suggest that the more appropriate class of models is abstract 
models (such as the multiple memory system and counter views, as well as another view 
discussed later), which posit that perceptual implicit memory is the result of changes in the 
activation or the strength of connections between abstract lexical representations. 
In her review of episodic and abstract theories of perceptual implicit memory, 
Tenpenny (1995) questioned whether abstract representations are needed to explain 
perceptual implicit memory. It might be informative to flip this question on its tail; in the 
light of the present research, are episodic representations needed to explain perceptual 
implicit memory? It could be argued that the lack of context-dependency might be an 
indication that the episodic representations underlying perceptual implicit memory are item-
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specific; they do not incorporate any processing that is not directed to the identification of the 
word. Thus, episodic theorists might state that no effect of context was found in the current 
research because the context was encoded separately from the items (words). Only the 
processing devoted to identification of the item itself is reflected in the episodic 
representations underlying perceptual implicit memory. However, most of the power of 
episodic theories stems from the assumption that traces incorporate all aspects of a 
processing episode, including context. Thus, the lack of context-dependency might be an 
indication that the representations underlying perceptual implicit memory are not episodic in 
nature. 
The results of the present research (especially the response context-dependency 
experiment) present some serious problems for Logan's (1988,1990) instance theory in 
particular. According to Logan's theory, the response made to a stimulus at encoding should 
have been incorporated into the memory representation. Thus, Logan would predict a 
reliable response context-dependency effect in the current research. No such effect was 
found. 
Episodic theorists could argue that the lack of context-dependency effects in the 
current research does not logically require a rejection of the episodic view. Recognition 
memory tests, which tap into episodic representations, also do not always show a context-
dependency effect (Smith, 1988). Indeed, much of Tenpenny's (199S) argument in favor of 
episodic theories rested on findings of intra-item (i.e., the characteristics of the item itself— 
its font, color, etc.) and extra-item (i.e., the characteristics external to the item itself— 
surrounding words, physical environment, etc.) context-dependencies in perceptual implicit 
memory. However, many of the examples of intra-item context dependencies are only found 
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when unusual stimuli are used. For example, changes in font only have an effect when 
strange fonts are used (Graf & Ryan, 1990). Indeed, the only intra-item context-dependency 
effect that is routinely found for words in perceptual implicit memory is modality of 
presentation, with greater perceptual implicit memory found when the modality in which 
words were presented at test matches the modality in which words were presented at 
encoding (Tenpenny, 1995). Modality effects are not necessarily indicators of an underlying 
episodic representation, however, because many abstract models of memory posit that the 
representations are modality specific or are reached through modality-specific processing 
pathways (Bower, 1986,1996; Morton, 1969; 1979). In addition, many of the studies that 
have reported finding extra-item environmental context-dependencies have manipulated the 
words that are paired with the critical words in the experiment (e.g., Graf & Schacter, 1985; 
Jacoby et al., 1992). As discussed earlier, the results of these experiments can be explained 
in terms of differences in processing rather than differences in context. Indeed, the current 
research demonstrated that a "purer" test of environmental context-dependency on well-
accepted tests of perceptual implicit memory does not show any effect of reinstating context 
(the environmental context-dependency experiments). Thus, the growing number of studies 
that have failed to find any context-dependency effect in perceptual implicit memory and the 
fact that abstract views predict no context-dependency effects, provide serious problems for 
an episodic view. 
Is An Abstract Theory Appropriate? 
The problems that the present research and other studies have posed for episodic 
theories of perceptual implicit memory lead one to consider whether an abstract theory might 
be the best way to conceptualize perceptual implicit memory. Both abstract frameworks 
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discussed in the introduction (the counter model of Ratcliff & McKoon, 1997; the multiple 
memory system view of Tulving & Schacter, 1990) would predict the results of the current 
research, as well as the overall lack of context-dependency effects on perceptual implicit 
memory. In both views, the representations underlying perceptual implicit memory are 
abstract in nature and so are not tied to the specific context of a prior episode. Because of 
this, reinstating the original context at test should have no effect on the level of perceptual 
implicit memory. However, there are problems with both of these accounts. 
The counter model was designed to account for one specific kind of perceptual 
implicit memory test: perceptual identification. In fact, it was designed to account for 
performance on a specific kind of perceptual identification test, one in which after a quick, 
masked presentation of a word the participant is presented with two words and asked to 
select the one that had just been presented. Ratcliff and McKoon (1997) found that 
participants were biased in their selection if they had seen one of the words on a previous 
task. For example, if participants were presented died for 33ms followed by a mask, and 
then were forced to choose between lied and died, they were more likely to choose lied if it 
had been presented on a previous task than if it had not. Although the counter model posits 
that the same mechanisms underlie performance on other perceptual implicit memory tasks 
(e.g., word-stem completion), this has yet to be verified. Thus, until it is generalized to other 
types of perceptual implicit memory tasks, the counter model is not a complete model of 
perceptual implicit memory. 
According to the multiple memory system view of Tulving and Schacter (1990), the 
memory representations underlying perceptual implicit memory for words are abstract lexical 
units stored in a memory system that is distinct and separate from other memory systems. 
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Similarly, the memory representations underlying perceptual implicit memory for objects are 
abstract structural descriptions stored in a memory system that is distinct and separate from 
the processing system used to identify objects, as well as other memory systems. Although 
this conceptualization seems plausible, recent evidence from Williams and Tarr (1997) 
suggests that the phenomenon of perceptual implicit memory for objects might not be best 
explained in terms of an abstract object memory system that is distinct from other memory 
systems. Rather, perceptual implicit memory for objects appears to reflect the operation of 
an abstract object recognition system that is integrated with other memory systems. It is 
possible that perceptual implicit memory for words reflects a similar abstract system that is 
used to identify words. 
Abstract frameworks of object recognition might aid in understanding the memory 
representation underlying perceptual implicit memory. There has been quite a bit of research 
using perceptual implicit memory paradigms to study the representations underlying object 
recognition (e.g., Biederman & Cooper, 1991; Cooper, Biederman, & Humble, 1992; 
Schacter, et al., 1990; Williams & Tarr, 1997). Strangely, though, there has been very little 
interaction between those researchers studying perceptual implicit memory for words and 
those researchers studying perceptual implicit memory for objects. This is in spite of 
neuropsychological evidence that the system responsible for recognizing objects appears to 
also be used for recognizing words (Farah, 1994). Because of this, it seems logical that the 
representations underlying word recognition (and thus perceptual implicit memory) should at 
least be similar in nature to those underlying object recognition. Perhaps a new and 
potentially better explanation of perceptual implicit memory for words can be constructed by 
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borrowing from a theory of the representations underlying repetition priming in object 
recognition. 
Biederman and colleagues (Biederman & Cooper, 1991; Cooper, et al., 1992) have 
found evidence that the representations underlying repetition priming in object recognition 
are abstract in nature. Their view is based on Biederman's (1987) Recognition-By-
Components model of basic-level object recognition and Hummel and Biederman's (1992) 
neural network model of object recognition. According to these models, basic-level object 
recognition occurs by activating the appropriate structural description for the object. This 
structural description is represented in memory by the abstract parts of the object (stored as 
abstract geometrical primitive, or geons) and the spatial relationships among the parts that 
make up the object. A structural description is active when the subgroup of geons and their 
relationships making up the object are active in the network (Hummel & Biederman, 1992). 
Repetition priming in objects can be modeled by changes in the weights between groups of 
geons making up an object (including the relationships among them) and the complete 
structural description. Thus, repetition priming with objects is affected by manipulations that 
affect the processing of these assemblies of geons (e.g., deleting portions of objects necessary 
to determine the geons and their relationships within an object) and the consequent ability to 
access the appropriate structural description. Repetition priming in objects is not affected by 
manipulations that do not affect this processing (e.g., changes in size between encoding and 
test) (Biederman & Cooper, 1991). 
It is possible that the representations underlying word recognition (and thus 
perceptual implicit memory for words) are similar to the representations posited by 
Biederman and colleagues. Indeed, both the letters (and phonemes/morphemes) and the 
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spatial arrangement of the letters/phonemes/morphemes are important to word identification. 
Changing the spatial arrangement of the morphemes in a word either results in no lexical 
representation being activated (e.g., abnormal to normalab) or a change in the lexical 
representation(s) activated (e.g., chambermaid to maid chamber). Changing the morphemes 
between encoding and test leads to no evidence of perceptual implicit memory (Weldon, 
1991). Weldon interpreted these resuhs in an episodic fi-araework (TAP), but they could also 
be an indication of an abstract "structural description" representation underlying word 
recognition and perceptual implicit memory. 
Bower (1986; 1996) has proposed a similar model for perceptual implicit memory for 
words. According to Bower, perceptual implicit memory for words reflects changes in 
cotmection weights between different layers in a word recognition system. This system first 
processes the physical characteristics of the letters in a word, which then activate letters and 
morphemes/phonemes (Bower does not commit to one over the other) as well as the spatial 
location of the letters and morphemes/phonemes within a word. These then activate 
appropriate lexical representations, which leads to identification of the word. When a word 
is identified, the weights between these layers of the model change dramatically. This weight 
change slowly decays over a period time. If a word is again presented before the weight 
change has completely decayed, it is more quickly and accurately identified than if the word 
had not been recently identified. The system is modality-specific and the representations are 
abstract. As in Biederman's (1987) model of object recognition, identification of a word 
depends upon the parts of the word (letters/morphemes/phonemes) and their spatial location. 
Bower's (1986,1996) model has not been widely accepted among perceptual implicit 
memory researchers. The conclusion among researchers has been that views such as 
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Bower's that explain perceptual implicit memory in terms of activation within a network are 
not adequate (Schacter, 1987). However, in light of the present research, it might be 
appropriate to reevaluate such a view. Indeed, such an abstract view could provide a 
parsimonious account of the extant phenomena in perceptual implicit memory, as well as 
provide new predictions to be tested. This abstract view would state that no effects were 
found in the current research (other than the old-new effect) because the encoding 
manipulations did not affect the processing of letters/morphemes/ phonemes and their spatial 
relations. This approach might also similarly explain why levels of processing manipulations 
(among others) do not affect perceptual implicit memory. Further, this approach would 
predict that other manipulations like changes in size between encoding and test would not 
affect perceptual implicit memory (because they do not disrupt the ability to identify the parts 
of the word), but other manipulations like rotating or reverse spelling might affect perceptual 
implicit memory (because they disrupt the spatial relations among the parts of the word). 
Indeed, such a model might explain why high levels of perceptual implicit memory were 
found in the current research. When a word is the focus of decisional processing at encoding 
it is likely that much of the changes in the weight of the coimections between components in 
the network will occur to the connections between components related to the lexical unit 
representing that word. However, when the word is not the focus of a decision at encoding, 
not as many changes in the weights of the connections will occur for the components related 
to the lexical unit representing that word. Rather, the weight changes will occur for 
components of the lexical units representing the words that were the focus of the decision at 
encoding. Because more changes in weights occur when a word is the focus of a decision at 
encoding, more perceptual implicit memory is found on a later perceptual implicit memory 
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test. Future research will need to detennine if this is a fruitful approach to conceptualizing 
perceptual implicit memory. If its predictions hold, it might provide a more parsimonious 
explanation of perceptual implicit memory than other extant episodic and abstract 
frameworks. 
In the introduction, the potential relationship of perceptual implicit memory to 
naturalistic decision-making was discussed. The proposed view attempted to provide a way 
to integrate the perceptual implicit memory literature into models of naturalistic decision­
making. The results of the present research do not support the proposed view, however, the 
present research might still be of benefit to decision-making researchers. The impact of the 
present research on the decision-making literature depends upon the nature of the 
representations guiding such decision-making. If they are context-specific, episodic 
representations (e.g., if firefighters retrieve memories of specific prior fires when they 
engage in situation assessment), then the present research suggests that they are not the same 
as the representations underlying perceptual implicit memory. If this is the case, perceptual 
implicit memory research will not aid in the understanding of the cognitive processes 
involved in naturalistic-decision making. If the representations are not context-specific and 
episodic (e.g., if firefighters retrieve an abstract prototype of a fire when they engage in 
situation assessment), then it is possible that they are similar to the representations 
underlying perceptual implicit memory and the understanding of the cognitive processes 
involved in naturalistic decision-making can be aided by research in perceptual implicit 
memory. 
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NOTES 
' Some theorists consider recognition to have a perceptual implicit memory 
component as well as a conceptual explicit component (e.g., Gardiner & Parkin, 1990). 
However, recognition is widely used as an explicit memory task in perceptual implicit 
memory research and so is considered a measure of conceptual explicit memory. 
^ As indicated in the text, episodic theories need not be instance theories. However, 
the subtle differences between instance theories and other episodic theories are not large 
enough to make different predictions on perceptual implicit memory task performance. 
Because of this, the terms "episode" and "instance" are used as equivalent terms in the 
dissertation. 
^ For formatting ease, all figures were made with Microsoft Excel. Because Excel 
does not allow the use of different size error bars for each bar in a graph, the error bars in 
Figures 2-4 represent the largest standard enor of the mean among the cells in the 
experiment. The exact means and standard errors are shown in Appendix A. 
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APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL TABLES FOR EXPERIMENTS 2,3A, AND 3B. 
Table A-L Old-New Difference Scores* on the Perceptual Identification Tasic in 
Experiment 2 as a Function of Response at Encoding and Response at Test 
Response at Encoding 
Vocal Written 
Response at Test M SE M SE 
Vocal .15* .02 .17* .03 
Written .20* .03 .15* .03 
' Values were obtained by subtracting the proportion of new words identified from the 
proportion of old words identified for each condition. 
* Reliably greater than zero, g < .05. 
Table A-2. Old-New Difference Scores* on the Perceptual Identification Task in 
Experiment 3a as a Function of Color at Encoding and Color at Test 
Color at Encoding 
Red Blue 
Color at Test M SE M SE 
Red .10* .02 .09* .02 
Blue .18* .03 .16* .03 
'Values were obtained by subtracting the proportion of new words identified from the 
proportion of old words identified for each condition. 
• Reliably greater than zero, g < .05. 
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Table A-3. Old-New Difference Scores* on the Word-Stem Completion Task in 
Experiment 3b as a Function of Color at Encoding and Color at Test 
Color at Encoding 
Red Blue 
Color at Test M SE M SE 
Red .22* .02 .21* .02 
Blue .15* .03 .14* .02 
' Values were obtained by subtracting the proportion of stems completed with new words 
from the proportion of stems completed with old words for each condition. 
• Reliably greater than zero, fi < .05. 
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APPENDIX B. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS FOR EXPERIMENT 3B 
Eleven participants reported that they consciously attempted to recall previously 
studied words to complete at least some of the word stems. The proportion of stems 
completed with old words and the proportion of stem completed with new words are shown 
in Table B-1 for each of the conditions for these participants. Perceptual implicit memory 
Table B-L Performance on the Word stem Completion Task in Experiment 3b for 
Participants Who Attempted to Recall Words as a Function of Color at Encoding and 
Color at Test 
Color at Encoding 
Red Blue New 
Color at Test M SE M SE M SE 
Red .41 .03 .38 .04 .16 .02 
Blue .33 .05 .35 .04 .19 .02 
was indexed as a difference score by subtracting the proportion of stems completed with new 
words from the proportion of words completed with old words. The difference scores are 
shown in Figure B-1. An ANOVA with color at encoding and color at test as within-subjects 
variables showed no reliable main effect of color at test, F(l, 10) = 2.71, MSE = .034, g = 
.131, or color at encoding, £ (1,10) = 0.17, MSE = .005, jj = .689. The interaction between 
the two variables was not reliable, F (1,10) = 0.55, MSE = .009, g = .474, but the pattern 
across the means was consistent with the occurrence of a context-dependency effect. 
Whether the suggested interaction is real or not can only be determined through further 
research. 
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Figure B-1. Oid-new difference scores on word-stem completion in 
Experiment 3a for participants who attempted to recall old words. 
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